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Is large-scale fair trade possible? 
Ronan Le Velly 
Abstract 
The article presents the changes in the nature of the market 
relationship that are induced by the expansion of fair trade. It 
shows that the increase in outlets leads to challenging working 
with “small producers”, the payment of a “fair price” that cannot 
be totally disconnected from market forces, and the rising 
impersonality of the producer-consumer relationship. Several 
types of fair trade on several scales are possible. The transition 
from a direct chain to an intermediated chain and then to a 
labelled chain increase the efficiency of trade but is accompanied 
by less opposition to the characteristics that fair trade activists 
attribute to the conventional market. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
More than a billion euros‟ worth of fair trade products was sold in the world in 2005. As a 
result of this relative commercial success, attention is now being paid to its potential as a way 
to combat poverty and contribute to sustainable development, despite the fact that fair trade 
has existed in most European countries for some three decades. The aim of this article is to 
show that this means more than just setting figures to the market shares that fair trade could 
achieve. Such a study is useful, but tends to mask the fact that fair trade is not a homogeneous 
reality. When we ask if large-scale fair trade is possible, we are actually trying to describe 
what type of fair trade can be envisioned on which scale. The question is not so much about 
the possibilities of outlets as about the changes in the trade relationship that the rising sales 
induce. 
These questions come out of a field study that I conducted of the main French promoters 
of fair trade, namely, Artisans du Monde and Max Havelaar (see the boxed text at the end of 
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the introduction). In 2005, the network of Artisans du Monde shops posted a turnover of 10 
million euros (this was twice the 2000 turnover), while a total of 120 million euros‟ worth of 
products bearing the Max Havelaar label was sold in France (this was twenty times as much 
as in 2000). Such advances cannot be explained without referring to the efforts that have been 
made over the past fifteen years. The Artisans du Monde network has increased and 
modernised its points of sale, and the quality of the foodstuffs and craftwork that they sell has 
improved considerably. Finally, under the impetus of Max Havelaar, fair trade products have 
come onto supermarket shelves. We are far from fair trade such as it existed in France until 
the early 1990s, that is, focused on tiny off-putting shops that a few rare consumers patronised 
as deliberate acts of commitment, buying coffee that was “disgusting” but “Sandinista”.1 
Yet for all that, fair trade advocates do not have an unequivocal interpretation of these 
developments. The activists are obviously overjoyed by the rising sales, which, as they point 
out, make it possible to reach a larger number of producers. However, on the other hand, the 
policies implemented to achieve these results can generate some unpleasant feelings. Many 
mention their fear of “selling their souls to the Devil” and, as a result of the compromises that 
they must make, “ending up as simple merchants”. These worries are largely the result of the 
hybrid, if not contradictory, nature of the fair trade plan itself. Fair trade advocates want to 
build a different model of trade to oppose what they perceive to be the malfunctioning of 
“conventional trade”. However, as soon as they also use certain capitalist economic gears to 
increase their sales, the question of the fair trade graft‟s being accepted or rejected arises. 
One finding of this study is that this positioning does indeed generate contradictions. This 
text therefore looks into these tensions and how Artisans du Monde and Max Havelaar 
France‟s activists see them. It does not concern either the producers or the consumers directly, 
but takes as its starting point observation of the work to build trade between these two 
opposite ends of the production-consumption chain that is both opposed to and within the 
market.
2
 We shall see first how difficult it is to offer products that meet the quality demands 
of the greatest number while working with “small producers”. Then, in the same way, we 
shall see that fair prices are not set completely without reference to conventional market 
prices. Finally, the last two sections will be devoted to the centralisation of imports in the 
                                                 
1
  See Gautier Pirotte‟s article in this volume for a description of Oxfam-World Shops‟ (Magasins du 
Monde/Wereldwinkels‟) patrons in Belgium. 
2
  I translate the relatively neutral French term of “filière” by “chain” and prefer not to use the 
expressions “commodity chain”, “value chain”, and “supply chain”, which have more specific theoretical 
meanings. See Raikes, Jensen & Ponte (2000) and Raynolds (2002). 
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Artisans du Monde network and the strategy of delegating commercial operations that is 
specific to the Max Havelaar system. These two situations will lead us to consider fair trade as 
a continuum of positioning assigning more or less weight to the desire to oppose or to 
participate fully in the market. 
 
The Artisans du Monde network and Max Havelaar France system 
 
The first Artisans du Monde shop opened in Paris in 1974, and the Artisans du Monde 
network is currently the largest French network of shops specialised in selling fair trade 
products (150 points of sale in 2005). The shops are run by volunteers, often aided by a part-
time or full-time salaried employee. For the most part, they are not supplied directly with 
craftwork and foodstuffs from the Third World producers‟ groups whose commodities they 
sell, but order their supplies from specialised fair trade importers. Their primary supplier is 
Solidar‟Monde, which was created at the initiative of the Artisans du Monde Federation in 
1984. 
Max Havelaar France, which was founded in 1992 following the example of the Dutch 
initiative of the same name, is a certifying body. In placing its logo on products it guarantees 
that these goods meet a set of formal criteria concerning production conditions and purchasing 
from the producers. In 2005, there were more than 100 registered traders in France (Alter Eco, 
Lobodis, Malongo, Solidar‟Monde, and so on). They are the ones who do the work of 
importing and processing the commodities and searching for sales outlets. The commodities 
bearing the Max Havelaar label (coffee, tea, bananas, etc.) are then sold to consumers in all 
sorts of sales circuit, but mostly in hyper- and supermarkets. 
The French organisations have been working in close co-operation with their foreign 
counterparts for the past ten years or so to harmonise the criteria for defining fair trade and to 
pool certain operations. Solidar'Monde is a member of the European Fair Trade Association 
(EFTA), which is a union of fair trade organisations (Gepa in Germany, Tradecraft in the 
United Kingdom, and so on) that co-ordinates its members activities when it comes to 
selecting and monitoring producers‟ groups. Similarly, Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International (FLO) sets the standards of the labelled system. FLO is an association of a score 
of national initiatives (Max Havelaar in France and the Netherlands, Transfair in Germany, 
Fairtrade in Great Britain and the United States, etc.). As a member of this framework, Max 
Havelaar France entrusts the operations of certifying producers‟ groups to FLO‟s auditors. 
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I. Which producers for which products? 
Studying the characteristics of the producers‟ groups targeted by fair trade is a way to 
approach the difficulty of being both against and in the market. This first part will be based on 
a reading of the principles and standards defined within EFTA and FLO (see the box above) 
and personal observations and interviews of French fair trade activists. This will enable us to 
grasp who the “small producers” with whom these activists wish to work are and to 
understand why it is so painful to demand that they produce “marketable products”. 
1. “Small producers” 
The term “small producers” has many meanings, but they are all aimed at building a type 
of trade that differs from conventional trade. First of all, the activists speak very often of “co-
operatives of small producers” to assert the importance of the principles of democratic 
organisation and the observance of human rights in the workplace, even though all the groups 
are far from having this legal status. The co-operative ideal is thought of in opposition to the 
image of the large corporation employing a wage-earning workforce and assumed to be the 
epitome of domination and exploitation. Next, the term “small producers” refers to the goal of 
preserving cultural traditions. Artisans du Monde‟s activists want the products that are sold in 
their shops to be made according to models and techniques that are faithful to their country of 
origin‟s traditions. In so doing, they wish to showcase the richness of their partners‟ skills and 
know-how. But, even more important, through this criterion they wish to show that they are 
not involved in a dominant relationship, one of sending out orders that the craftsman fills. 
From this perspective, working with small-scale producers seems to be a guarantee of true 
craftsmanship and cottage-industry work involving little mechanisation, standardisation, and 
acculturation of the goods. Finally, and most important, through this term the fair trade 
organisations are targeting “marginalised small producers”. Fair trade strives to give 
organisations that which conventional trade does not:  Because of their small size, low 
investment level, handicaps, or discrimination, small producers are described as having no 
access to the conventional market or failing to get satisfactory payment for their work. The 
conventional market is seen as functioning to the detriment of the “disadvantaged producers 
who do not have the means to make it on their own and finally live at the mercy of large 
companies”3 Working with small producers without wielding the market power that this 
procures is yet another way to assert fair trade‟s difference. 
                                                 
3
  Max Havelaar France volunteer interviewed on 18 February 2004. 
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2. “Marketable products” 
Since the early 1990s, fair trade advocates in France and the other European countries 
alike have no longer contented themselves with a symbolic denunciatory function. They want 
to expand market outlets beyond died-in-the-wool activists in order to support the producers‟ 
development fully. To do this, efforts to “professionalise” operations were made first in the 
North (locating the shops in more central shopping areas, training the volunteers in sales 
techniques, hiring employees, selling through mass distribution, advertising, and so on).
4
 
However, this demand for professionalisation also concerns the South. EFTA‟s principles 
state very explicitly that producers‟ groups must “seek to produce a marketable product”.5 
There, too, the aim is to reach a larger number of consumers, but in the activists‟ view, the 
aim is also to sell quality products that establish a relationship of dignity, rather than charity, 
between producers and consumers. 
So, several questions in the assessment questionnaire that EFTA‟s members use are aimed 
at the “small producers” that we have just been discussing. These are questions about working 
conditions (health and safety), procedures of democratic representation, degree of marginality, 
community development projects carried out, and so on. However, the information that is 
requested is also aimed at determining whether the imported goods meet European technical 
standards and consumer tastes (quality approach, innovation, design, etc.) and whether the 
producers have sufficient production and export capacities. The first consequence of this 
approach is that the craftwork increasingly undergoes cultural adaptation. Even though some 
people continue to regret this, even though they speak about “teamwork” and “local 
designers” to defuse criticism, it is currently acknowledged that the products are made to meet 
Western consumers‟ tastes without necessarily adhering to the strict criterion of cultural 
authenticity (Littrell and Dickson, 1999; Grimes and Milgram, 2000). This also affects the 
nature of the producers who are selected. For example, in 2002 the importer Solidar'Monde 
(see box) asked Artisans du Monde Federation‟s Board of Directors to choose between two 
Burkina Faso bronze casters‟ organisations. It submitted the following opinion to help inform 
the board‟s choice: 
The Toure Issaka group has the advantage of being a group of authentic traditional bronze 
casters, which is not the case of Zod Neere. … [but] one of the reasons that make us more 
                                                 
4
  For a presentation of marketing techniques‟ application to fair trade, see De Pelsmacker et al.‟s article 
in this volume. 
5
  EFTA, Fair Trade Guidelines, 1996. 
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inclined to choose Zod Neere is that...Toure Issaka seems to work as if coping with 
emergencies and in a situation of extreme [financial] precariousness from which it is 
impossible for them to extricate themselves without external support inside the country. It 
is hard for us to see how this group could evolve and shake off its precariousness, even 
though, of course, having work for part of the year would probably be of considerable 
benefit to them in the short run. ...Zod Neere, in contrast, seems to think about and have 
an approach aimed at development...And lastly, it is probably more reliable and more 
sustainable.
6
 
The federation heeded this opinion and chose Zod Neere. It preferred an organisation with 
community development plans and market capacities that were described as high to another 
group that was more culturally authentic and marginal. In the past, opposite choices have been 
made and Solidar‟Monde continues to work with some highly marginalised informal 
structures (especially a few partners who have been on the scene since its creation in the 
1980s). However, today, when a new group is selected, awareness of the constraints 
associated with market participation leads to renouncing some of the principles that are 
specific to working with “small producers”. 
In the same vein, FLO‟s standards state, “…the producers must have access to the 
logistical, administrative and technical means to bring a quality product to the market”.7 For 
example, to apply for inclusion in the coffee register, a group must first of all fill out a 
questionnaire that specifies the means of communication and transport at its disposal and send 
in a sample of the coffee that it could export. The importers and industrialists that sell large 
volumes of coffee to supermarkets and/or food chains such as Starbucks refuse to have poor-
quality products and demand regular deliveries (Argenti, 2004). Consequently, the producers‟ 
groups in FLO‟s register cannot be the most marginalised. This trend is reflected first of all in 
their strong geographical concentration. In October 2003, 33% of the suppliers (all products 
together) were in Central America, 26% in South America, 17% in Asia, 14% in Africa, and 
10% in the Caribbean. Mexico alone had 16% of the organisations in the register.
8
 These 
figures can be explained by the history of fair trade, but they also stem from the Mexican 
producers‟ better production and shipping capacities compared with Black African or Haitian 
producers. Next, several field studies have confirmed that purchases within each country are 
                                                 
6
  Solidar'Monde, Candidatures producteurs bronziers Burkina Faso, 18 January 2002. 
7
  FLO, Generic Fair Trade Standards for Small Farmers’ Organisations, January 2003. 
8
  Max Havelaar France, Fair(e) Actualités, January 2004. 
Edwin Zaccai (éd.), Sustainable consumption, ecology and fair trade, Londres, Routledge, 2007 
 7 
clustered around the most developed organisations in the register and the least structured 
groups fail to get fair trade orders (Eberhart and Chaveau, 2002; Shreck, 2002; Murray, 
Raynolds and Taylor, 2003). 
II. How to set the producers’ remunerations? 
The ambition of boosting sales, even if that means being more competitive, is a source of 
injunctions that contradict the assertion of trade turned towards marginalised “small 
producers” who uphold cultural traditions. This contradiction between the will to participate 
actively in the market and the ideal of opposing the characteristics that are attributed to the 
conventional market is also clearly visible in the ways the prices that are paid to the producers 
are set. 
1. “Fair prices” 
A poster used by Artisans du Monde in the early 1990s bore the following succinct text, 
“Du café, juste un commerce ou un commerce plus juste?” (“Coffee: Just trade or more just 
trade?”). In just a few words, the network asserted the assumed unfairness of conventional 
trade and the need to create an alternative. Speaking of fair prices implies a principle of 
setting the prices paid to producers that escapes the impersonal confrontation of supply and 
demand. It is in precisely this perspective that FLO strives to establish minimum prices for 
most of its products that are disconnected from market forces. The formula for calculating the 
minimum price that is being discussed within FLO should thus allow for production costs, the 
costs that are attached to converting to meet fair trade criteria (for example, the reorganisation 
of work), what is deemed to be a reasonable profit margin, and a bonus enabling the 
producers‟ groups to improve their production capacities and living conditions. On the other 
hand, it should not include the global production volume or consumer market prices, which 
are parameters associated with the way the conventional market functions. The aim is to assert 
a different way of framing the picture – a “reverse mechanism”, according to its proponents – 
that marks the specificity of fair trade. 
2. Market prices 
This anti-market frame, however, is never totally closed to market influences (Callon, 
1998). For example, when world coffee prices hit rock bottom in late 2001 the fair trade 
coffee sold in German and Swedish supermarkets cost twice as much as conventional coffee. 
While consumers agreed that the “fair trade” label justified a higher price, such a difference 
Edwin Zaccai (éd.), Sustainable consumption, ecology and fair trade, Londres, Routledge, 2007 
 8 
made the product practically unsellable. Given this context, FLO mulled over the possibility 
of lowering the minimum price of coffee, and rumours that it would drop to US$1.00 per 
pound (instead of US$1.21) circulated throughout 2002. The idea of creating a fund for 
marketing operations was also considered as a more indirect way of coping with the crunch. 
Finally, the fair price of coffee remained unchanged and the creation of a marketing fund was 
postponed. It is true that the invoicing of certification visits that was decided in 2003 already 
places a financial burden on the producers. In addition, the gap between the minimum price 
and commodity market price for coffee has narrowed greatly over the past few years. 
The tension concerns the level of the minimum price, but it can also concern the very 
existence of a minimum price. So, not all FLO standards impose a minimum price. The most 
noteworthy exception is tea, for which the producer and importer freely negotiate a market 
price to which a “development premium” in the amount set by FLO is added. The negotiated 
price is supposed to “at least cover [the] cost of production”9, but nothing sets it formally. 
When the rice standards were drawn up in 2001, there was a debate within FLO between the 
advocates of a “market approach” and those of a “minimum price approach”. The former 
argued their case based upon the risk of completely disconnecting purchasing prices from 
conventional market conditions and the latter upon the danger that freely negotiated prices 
might not cover production costs. The upshot of these discussions was the drafting in 2003 of 
rice standards that involved the payment of a 10-12% premium above the market price and 
then, one year later, the drafting of new standards that this time set minimum prices. 
There are also no minimum prices for craftwork imported by EFTA members. The 
problem for these goods hinges on the difficulty of establishing a nomenclature for the items 
being traded. The purchase prices are set case by case and take account not only of the 
producers‟ production costs and needs, but also of the prices that the items could fetch in the 
North. Some items that are deemed too expensive thus cannot be bought, possibly despite the 
value of their makers‟ development projects. For other goods, a round of bargaining is 
launched to get lower rates. Consequently, it happens that the purchase prices paid by fair 
trade importers are the same as those paid by conventional trade buyers. Many activists find 
this difficult to swallow, given that they are used to associating a fair price with one that is 
necessarily above the market price or hold that the importer should never challenge the 
producer‟s asking price. Yet that does not mean in itself that the prices paid do not enable the 
producers and their families to earn a decent living or to “live in dignity”, to quote the 
                                                 
9
  FLO, Fair Trade Standards for Tea, October 2004. 
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campaign slogan. These activists‟ reactions attest above all to the discomfort that is generated 
by fair trade‟s current positioning in the scheme of things. Being opposed to the market is not 
enough to be protected from market forces. 
III. Direct or intermediated relationship? 
Working with “small producers” and setting “fair prices” calls for knowledge of the 
producers‟ groups‟ situations and taking this into account in establishing trade relations. 
However, the objective of personalising relations does not stop there. Fair trade activists want 
to establish direct links and “interknowledge” between producers and consumers. 
1. “The idea of the invisible hand has given way to the idea of 
working hand in hand”10 
Fair trade is opposed to the presence of local middlemen or moneylenders (“loan sharks” 
or “usurers”) who use their positions of strength to impose their conditions on “small 
producers”. According to a deeply rooted stereotype among fair trade activists, such parties 
are “coyotes”, “parasites” that get rich at the workers‟ expense. Fair trade is then described, 
for example in Artisans du Monde‟s teaching kits, as including fewer middlemen than 
conventional trade. Moreover, EFTA‟s principle‟s and FLO‟s standards alike stipulate that 
fair trade importers must pay for a part of their orders in advance so that the producers do not 
have to borrow funds at exorbitant rates. 
The goal of a direct, personalised relationship also means that the importers are involved 
in a lasting relationship with the producers. In a stationary market such as that of craftwork, 
such a stand corresponds to a principle of non-competition. When the Artisans du Monde 
network already has a partner for a specific type of crafted article, it abstains from working 
with another group that would compete with its current partner. The activists consider this an 
indispensable rule, once again to distinguish fair trade from the conventional market. To use 
the famous terminology, voice and loyalty must be preferred to defection (Hirschman, 1970). 
The lack of a personalised, lasting commitment would lead the discussion back solely to the 
matter of products and prices and result in behaviour that would be incompatible with the 
producers‟ development. 
Finally, Artisans du Monde and Max Havelaar‟s activists want to have “interknowledge” 
relationships with producers. They want to know how the producers work, exchange 
                                                 
10
  Brid Bowen in EFTA (2001, p. 25) 
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information about their daily lives, know what their plans, projects, and difficulties are. While 
this link with the “producers behind the products” is important for the activists themselves, it 
is also important because it must be extended to consumers. Even if the physical distance 
between the parties does not change, Michael Goodman explains, it is nevertheless possible to 
reduce the feeling of distance and otherness such that “the well-off „us‟ (consumers) and 
poorer „them‟ (producers) becomes a „we‟ (participants in the same network)” (Goodman, 
2004, p. 907). In Artisan du Monde‟s shops, this link is forged by displaying panels depicting 
the groups or their locations on a large world map. Information, snapshots, and testimonials 
are also printed on the foodstuffs‟ packaging or on small cards attached to the craft items that 
are bought. Finally, the salespeople see it as their duty to discuss development issues with 
their customers and fill them in on the product‟s “story”. 
Ultimately, the dream fair trade chain is a transparent relationship of reciprocal knowledge 
and respect between producers and consumers on a market devoid of merchants. Of course, 
fair trade chains actually operate in less black-and-white and, above all, more variable, ways. 
2. Intermediation and impersonalisation in the Artisans du Monde 
chain 
In the early 1980s, Artisans du Monde had some twenty shops in France and no 
centralised importing structure. The shops placed their orders directly with the producers‟ 
groups that they had found through common acquaintances and then exchanged items 
amongst themselves in order to increase their ranges. Solidar‟Monde was created in 1984 for 
the purpose of importing foodstuffs. Since the latter came from other European fair trade 
agents, this did not trigger any major discussion within the movement. However, debate 
quickly arose around the possibility of extending this centralisation to craft items in order to 
rationalise ordering and warehousing. It nevertheless took two general assemblies of the 
Artisans du Monde Federation to reach agreement on the principle of centralising craft 
imports. The main reasons for the members‟ reservations had to do with the disappearance of 
the direct, personalised link that would result from Solidar‟Monde‟s intermediation. This 
argument explains why even today some Artisans du Monde groups continue to import items 
directly as a sideline. Many of the volunteers in the particular group that I observed feel that 
such relations are vital. For example, the group buys items from a centre for physically 
disabled children in India that was created by a volunteer‟s uncle. At each meeting this 
volunteer reads out letters recounting life at the centre. These moments have all the 
characteristics of information about friends whose lives the group has been following for 
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years, whose successes are reasons for rejoicing (for example, when the centre‟s children are 
at the head of their classes in the local school) and whose problems are announced cautiously 
(“I‟m afraid that the news is not good…”). 
Solidar‟Monde tries to maintain such ties with the producers by transmitting written 
information about them to Artisans du Monde‟s activists and by organizing visits for 
producers‟ representatives, but the relations that are instituted are less regular and intense than 
those that the decentralised import schemes made possible. Yet for all that, there are no plans 
to return to the old system. Centralised purchasing management enables the network to rely 
on a larger number of producers‟ groups, greatly facilitates stock and delivery management, 
and makes the creation of a wide, co-ordinated, and frequently renewed product range 
possible. In a context in which active participation in the market is advocated (selling more to 
support more producers) and competition between fair trade importers is fierce, centralising 
imports appears to be inevitable for the Artisans du Monde network. 
This confirms the opposition between the injunction to participate in the market and that 
of opposing the market. However, we are also starting to understand better that the arbitration 
between these two injunctions can take several forms. The shops‟ direct imports and 
centralised importing thus appear to be two ways of structuring the chain that assign relative 
weights to the desire to be commercially effective and the desire to create a “different kind of 
trade”. One volunteer with a long history in the Artisans du Monde movement expresses this 
positioning difference perfectly as she stresses not only the degree of personalisation but also 
the type of producer involved and the shops‟ price-setting procedures: 
[When it comes to] Solidar‟Monde, it has to stand on its own two feet; things must be 
balanced; it is not charity work. And it is true that sometimes we deplored their refusal to 
work with small co-operatives, with small groups…as I objected, “That is our main reason 
for being!” Yes, it‟s wonderful, for example, to import embroidery from Palestine, but if it 
doesn‟t sell, whom does it help? What good is it? So, we were truly harassed, we had 
requests from Palestinian women, it was horrible, truly horrible…We were directly in 
touch with these Palestinian women, and they wrote us heart-rending letters, and then their 
embroidery didn‟t sell, because a selling price had to be set, and when it comes to prices, 
Solidar‟Monde is a hard bargainer:  If it doesn‟t sell, they don‟t take it…Artisans du 
Monde aims to be more structured. [Silence] In the beginning, Artisans du Monde was 
like that, somewhat, very strong on relationships, and as it became more structured we lost 
a little of that. That is why the longstanding members here are highly committed to 
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maintaining relations with direct partners, because some of that comes through. We get 
news from them; they write to us, we wonder what is happening when we get no news 
from them…11 
IV Controlling the chain or delegating business activities? 
The idea that I ultimately wish to defend is that of a continuum of possible positionings 
assigning different relative weights to the imperatives of effective business and opposition to 
the market. Seen from this standpoint, the labelled chain set up under FLO appears to be 
located on a third level of market participation after direct and integrated chains. This induces 
some significant perverse effects regarding the goal of creating a “different type of trade”. 
1. Delegation as a sales-boosting strategy 
The difference between the integrated chain (Artisans du Monde) and labelled chain (Max 
Havelaar) lies in the classic alternative of doing something and having it done. The integrated 
chain‟s organisations run their commercial operations themselves. The labelled chain, in 
contrast, is marked by twofold delegation, that of selling and importing. Several types of 
agent are involved in the sales end (restaurants, food chains, catering, mail-order houses, etc.), 
but the main targets are hyper- and supermarkets. Max Havelaar France‟s employees and 
volunteers are very quick to criticise the way the major distribution chains work, but in a 
country where, as they systematically point out, 80% of consumer goods are sold via these 
circuits, refusing to take part in the mass distribution system amounts to action throttling the 
producers‟ development. In other words, whereas the Artisans du Monde network has fewer 
than 150 shops across the entire country, the 10,000 POS in France that sell labelled products 
give each and every resident of France access to fair trade. So, Max Havelaar‟s Dutch 
founders, Nico Roozen and Frans Vanderhoff (2002), explain that they would have liked to 
have imported and processed the products for mass distribution themselves, but had to give up 
such ideals because of the lack of financial means and marketing expertise of the international 
solidarity organisations that supported their project. The labelling strategy was thus a way of 
recognising that large-scale business activity was not within the scope of the organisations 
spawned by solidarity associations and it would be better to delegate such tasks to external 
agents. 
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  Artisans du Monde volunteer interviewed on 5 February 2003. 
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2. The perverse effects of delegating activities 
The labelling-delegating strategy aims to change the scale of fair trade. Moreover, there is 
no doubt that it is perfectly effective on this score. Six to seven times more fair trade products 
were sold in supermarkets than in specialised shops in 2004 in France alone (this same ratio is 
borne out across Europe as a whole – see Krier, 2005). However, delegating activities also has 
perverse effects on the ambition of creating a type of trade that differs from conventional 
market activities. 
First of all, delegating a task increases its impersonality. Compared with Solidar‟Monde‟s 
employees, Max Havelaar France‟s employees have little reason to be in touch with the 
producers and are less able to provide information about them. Next, the centralisation of 
monitoring and support functions for the producers‟ organisations under the FLO system has 
increased the northern activists‟ distance from the southern producers even more (Murray, 
Raynolds and Taylor, 2003). Finally, the creation of links between producers and consumers 
is weakened by selling through supermarkets. It is difficult to post more information than 
what can be fit on the package and impossible to be physically present in each and every 
supermarket to tell shoppers about the producers‟ living conditions. 
This loss of contact goes hand in hand with a loss of control. In integrated chains, fair 
trade associations control the commercial activities they are carried out. In labelled chains, 
they merely check that practices comply with pre-established standards. FLO does not choose 
directly the organisations that benefit from fair trade. By setting up a register of groupings 
that meet its criteria, it merely draws up a shortlist of sources from which the registered 
traders select their suppliers. Importers in the labelled chain are thus perfectly free to prefer to 
work with already well-structured groupings rather than “marginalised small producers”. 
They can also prefer private plantations to “small farmers‟ co-operatives”. Most of the FLO 
registers do not propose such a choice, but when they do, as in the case of bananas or tea, 
competition between private plantations and co-operatives generally ends up favouring the 
former, given their ability to deliver more constant quality and at more regular intervals 
(Shreck, 2002). The difference between the integrated and labelled chains in this respect is 
important. If Artisans du Monde‟s activists wish to, they can force Solidar‟Monde, of which 
they are shareholders and the main customer, to work more with groups that fit the “small 
farmer” or “craftsman” image. Max Havelaar‟s activists cannot impose such demands on the 
commercial operators, unless they push through a difficult change in their standards. 
Edwin Zaccai (éd.), Sustainable consumption, ecology and fair trade, Londres, Routledge, 2007 
 1
4 
Comprehension is dawning that delegating these tasks entails a change in the market‟s 
structure and creates conditions for competition between the producers‟ groups. Being 
included in the producers‟ register proves that an organisation meets fair trade standards but 
does not automatically result in purchases. Forty percent of the organisations in the coffee 
register have never had a single order under fair trade terms (Eberhart and Chaveau, 2002). 
All in all, only one-fifth of the tonnage of coffee produced under fair trade conditions is 
bought at the minimum price set by FLO. The rest is sold at global market prices or slightly 
above the market price when the additional quality warrants it. The producers are thus 
objectively in a situation of competition and fair trade importers have the power to bargain in 
their favour. However, things do not stop there. The delegation strategy also leads to granting 
the label to all traders who meet FLO‟s trade standards and then letting them look for 
distributors on their own. Some twenty coffee roasters were offering fair trade coffee to 
supermarkets in France in early 2005. (The number of fair trade suppliers of other 
commodities, such as chocolate and bananas, is more limited for the time being.) Given the 
very high concentration of the French supermarket sector, the roasters are under great 
pressure. As Marie-Christine Renard points out so well, “…paradoxically, while this network 
was intended to avoid mechanisms for competition, they begin to appear” (Renard, 1999, p. 
498). As a result, we can add, whereas the aim of fair trade is to cancel out downstream 
market power, the labelling-delegation strategy ends up restoring this power. 
This pressure, which comes to bear first on the registered traders, and then on the 
producers, can have effects that are contrary to the plan of building alternative trade. Coffee 
farmers agree to sell the non-fair-trade parts of their harvests at below-market prices in 
change for increases in the volumes sold at the fair minimum price. This practice, which FLO 
calls “bonded contracts”, is an indirect way to reduce the fair minimum price. Similarly, the 
partial prefinancing of harvests is not systematic. Here, too, there is not really any fraud, for, 
according to FLO standards, this prefinancing is done “on the request of the seller”.12 The 
importer‟s bargaining position can then be one of forgoing prefinancing in exchange for a 
larger order. Such malfunctioning is more improbable in integrated chains. Solidar'Monde and 
its European counterparts cannot use a non-fair-trade part of an order in bargaining over the 
purchasing conditions. Next, the shops for them are relatively captive outlets that do not 
demand high profit margins. Finally, the commitment to a long-term business relationship that 
is so strongly asserted in the integrated chains tends to reduce the possibility of such 
                                                 
12
  FLO, Fair Trade Standards for Coffee, June 2004. 
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manipulations. In contrast, the FLO standards are rather undemanding in this regard. While, in 
principle, “…buyers and sellers will procure to establish a long-term and stable 
relationship”13, the formal requirements do not exceed one season. Labelled fair trade is a still 
young and fragile initiative and imposing too demanding standards would run the risk of 
dissuading commercial players from taking part in it. 
This does not mean that the levels of FLO‟s standards are fundamentally low. In reality, 
they are definitely much higher, especially when it comes to the fair price and collective 
representation criteria, than those of competing labels such as Bioéquitable, Rainforest 
Alliance and Utz Kapeh. The Bioéquitable label has won over only a few small companies in 
France so far, but in the United States the Rainforest Alliance‟s criteria have attracted the 
food giants Kraft Foods, Procter & Gamble and Chiquita. Similarly, Sara Lee is working with 
Utz Kapeh to certify part of its Douwe Egberts coffee in the Netherlands and Belgium. For 
FLO‟s members, who are financed by the licence fees that their registered traders pay, these 
situations mean losses to make up and a risk of bankruptcy. Once again, this situation is the 
result of a delegation strategy that leads to being dependent on commercial operators‟ 
participation. If FLO does not want to lower its standards, it can only bank on its image and 
customer knowledge and recognition. This is a difficult wager, given that the latter are even 
less used to looking at what lies behind a label than behind a product. While fair trade 
contests commodity fetishism, one of the hobbles on its development is precisely the 
predominance of this fetishism in consumers‟ behaviour (Hudson and Hudson, 2003). 
Conclusions 
This article does not evaluate the match between fair trade principles and practices. It 
shows, rather, that the presence of contradictory principles makes such an assessment 
extremely subjective. Boosting sales is now an integral part of the fair trade plan, on a par 
with constructing a different form of trade. For example, saying that Solidar‟Monde‟s 
intermediation harms the personalisation of trade relationships is not enough to condemn this 
intermediation, given the additional number of outlets it creates for Third World producers‟ 
groups. Similarly, while the labelling-delegating strategy induces regrettable malfunctioning, 
it remains a way to boost the market for the producers‟ outputs considerably. Several types of 
fair trade are possible and direct imports by shops, the integrated chain, and the labelled chain 
are in this regard three stages on a continuum in which practices are turned more and more 
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  Ibid. 
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toward market participation and guided less and less by opposition to the market. The 
question that can be raised is that of the limits of such a continuum. Is it still possible to talk 
about fair trade when such criteria of opposition to the market as a minimum price and 
collective representation have been dropped, as the Bioéquitable, Rainforest Alliance, and Utz 
Kapeh labels have done? 
More generally, this analysis of fair trade updates and refines Max Weber‟s (1978) 
pessimistic finding that it is impossible to rebuild within the capitalist system an economy 
governed by substantive rationality that is mindful of people and concerned about moral, 
religious, political, and aesthetic imperatives.
14
 Several recent economic sociology studies 
suggest that Max Weber was doubtless wrong to consider the capitalist market order‟s 
constraints to be a homogeneous, omnipotent force. Market transactions in capitalist 
economies can accommodate a variety of justifications meeting different principles of fairness 
without one‟s necessarily assuming that formal, calculating, self-interested rationality is at 
work (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Moreover, there are numerous situations of markets in 
which the written rules, cultural representations, and/or balances of power interfere deeply 
with the impersonal mechanism of matching supply and demand that Weber described 
(Fligstein, 2001; Zelizer, 2005). In showing the social underpinnings of the various fair trade 
chains‟ construction and the variety of ethical principles that preside over their development, 
the work summarised in this article confirms these analyses‟ relevance (for more in the same 
vein, see Raynolds, 2002). Despite all that, this work also cautions against focusing only on 
the social conditions of market building. The constraints linked to participating in the 
capitalist market order of which Weber (1978) spoke must be grasped with discernment, but 
must not be taken out of the analysis. Like Andrew Sayer (2001), I believe that one cannot 
understand how markets work by postulating the existence of a market force that is 
independent from social considerations or concentrating exclusively on the variety of contexts 
in which exchanges take shape. The social construction of market transactions and constraints 
of the market order are mutually determined and must be examined together. So, when 
Artisans du Monde and Max Havelaar‟s activists call for fairer and less anonymous relations 
with the producers of the South, this of course refers to a cultural representation of the ravages 
                                                 
14
  The following sections in the two volumes of Economy and Society raise these issues directly: “Formal 
and substantive rationality of economic action”, “The disintegration of the household: the rise of the calculative 
spirit and the modern capitalist enterprise”, “Religious ethics and the world: economics”, “The market: its 
impersonality and ethic”, and “Hierocratic and charismatic ethics versus non-ethical capitalism” (Weber, 1978, 
pp. 85-86, 375-381, 576-590, 635-640, and 1185-1188). 
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wreaked by the conventional market, but also results from a very real trend in the capitalist 
world that they feel all the more strongly for being caught in its grip. 
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